The term "Franchise Player" gets thrown around a lot, and I'm not sure there is a consensus about what the term actually means. To many people it seems to designate simply the best player on a team. The star if you will. To me it simply means the backbone of the team to build around. While there is a lot of overlap between the two definitions, there are also differences which I believe need to be stressed.
In both cases the one player a team is putting its bets on, hoping that he will lead them into the promised land and win the Stanley Cup. The biggest difference between the star and the backbone is how they attempt to accomplish this. The star is about skill and talent, attempting to drag up the team by their own effort and contributions. The backbone on the other hand is about leadership and responsibility, furthering team accomplishment by getting other players to play better and impacting the team by doing more than just scoring. He is often tasked with the tough minutes against the opponents top lines and taking the assignments nobody else wants. This also makes him often the prime candidate for the Captaincy of a team.
Of course this doesn't mean that a player can't do both, but it may be a lot better for a team if they don't. Responsibilities should be distributed according to a players capabilities, and one player being forced to doing it all can be very stressful and also break him. Of course a team has a much better chance to succeed if it has multiple players of a "franchise player" caliber, as long as they span both definitions, and they will have it a lot harder if they are missing either or both.
A positive example from the past are the Montreal Canadiens of the 70s and 80s. You had Bob Gainey as the Backbone, and players like Guy Lafleur and Ken Dryden as the stars. Bob Gainey a consummate professional and defensive specialist held the captaincy from 1981 to his retirement in 1989, earning himself the nickname "Le Capitaine". He allowed the Canadians to function and succeed even though his contributions rarely showed on the scoreboard. They even invented an award, the Frank J. Selke Trophy, because they had to give him something.
A modern day example in a similar manner could be the combination of Jonathan Toews and Patrick Kane in Chicago. While Kane is a high-flying superstar, impressing with his scoring ability, Toews takes responsibility in leading the team. Toews is the captain of the Blackhawks and while he leads by example, he also knows how to get his team to perform.
Not being careful in the selection process of the captaincy can also severely backfire, as not every star player is also capable of playing the role of the backbone. Take a look at the Washington Capitals and you know what I mean. While Alex Ovechkin is a bona fide super star, a human scoring machine and a constant threat on the ice, he does not appear to have the leadership qualities required from a captain, as evident by his shrinking presence in the face of adversity. This could be observed throughout the years and the routine early exits from the playoffs, as well as most recently in the Olympics and the poor performance of the Russian national team.
This forces other, more veteran players to speak up, such as was seen in 2010 during 24/7, when Mike Knuble had to speak up and attempt to bring the Capitals out of a slump. The Capitals are also now doomed, as they can hardly take the captaincy away from Ovechkin even if they were to find a player show greater leadership qualities.
Perhaps this also illustrates a different point. When discussing this topic on a hockey board I regularly visit, the main focus was Patrice Bergeron of the Boston Bruins. I consider Bergeron a franchise player by my definition, a player who will take on the tough minutes and get other players to perform while providing constant contributions, even if they aren't earth-shattering. Another poster disagreed, declaring him only an exceptional role player and drawing parallels to Bobby Holik with the implications about Holik's ridiculous contract he signed with the Rangers.
However, the difference between a backbone-type "franchise player" and an "exceptional role player" was left undefined. To me, each player on a team needs a role he has to fulfill, with those roles being distributed according to the abilities of each player. If Bergeron's role is taking the defensive assignments, and is completing his tasks in an exceptional manner to the point where he is a cornerstone of the success of the franchise, he should very well be considered a franchise player.
For my favorite team, I hope that Sean Couturier becomes a franchise player in the same way Bergeron is to the Bruins. Couturier already is one of the best defensive forwards in the NHL, and while his offensive output still needs to improve, he provides great value to the team as a whole. He definitely has the potential to be a fundamental building block for the Philadelphia Flyers and he has to be if the Flyers want to find success in the near future.
Freitag, 28. Februar 2014
Sonntag, 23. Februar 2014
Book Review: Gordie Howe's Son
Hockey is an old sport. Many great and fantastic tales have happened within it long before I was even born. I am always interested in learning about them. When Mark Howe, one of the greatest players for my favorite franchise, released his biography and I was eager to read it. Unfortunately, the cover and title of the book made me a little anxious.
Of course it's rude and often wrong to judge a book by its cover, but personally I have always maintained that Mark being viewed primarily as the son of Gordie has been a slight detriment to his career. It may be one of the factors, alongside his time in the WHA, that prevented him from being inducted into the Hockey Hall of Fame. The subtitle of the book "A Hall of Fame Life in the Shadow of Mr. Hockey" seemed to hammer this home as well, particularly the last cover above showing a childhood picture of Mark.
The subtitle could also be discarded as meddling by the publisher, attempting to make it more appealing to a more casual crowd who have heard of Gordie but not Mark. Bu the title itself seems to have been chosen deliberately by Mark. I was aware of the deep bond father and son share, probably best exemplified by Mark's Hall of Fame acceptance speech (which happens to be the end point of the book), but reading the book made me appreciate this relationship a whole lot more. The book does not only follow the career of a great player, but also showcases a true and truly wonderful example of a relationship between parents and children, one that everyone should strive to achieve.
This is not limited to Gordie either, as we also often encounter Mark's mother, Colleen Howe, as a mother as well as a hockey executive dealing smartly with a rather sexist society within hockey's confines, while lending support and guidance to her sons and her husband. This makes it only more tragic when in the second to last chapter we follow along as she suffers from Pick's disease, a neuro-degenerative disease robbing her of her personality and cognitive function, that would eventually take her life.
This is not the only tragedy Mark has encountered throughout his career. Unlike other books about the Flyers I have read, this biography is not shying away from discussing the death of Pelle Lindbergh, who lost his life in a drunk-driving incident weeks into the 1985-86 season. The devastation left in its wake is personal, and only eclipsed by the pain seen when, days before the HoF induction ceremony, Mark learns of the tragic plane crash that took the life of most of the Lokomotiv Yaroslavl team, Mark's friend and former defense partner Brad McCrimmon.
McCrimmon becomes one of the biggest examples of what the book does right: Presents people as who they are, genuine and multi-dimensional. The book scatters anecdotes throughout its narrative which helps the reader understand the various people as actual human beings, rather than people you read about in the paper, and one can appreciate those people for who they are.
Throughout his career Mark has encountered many characters, and the career itself had many ups and downs as well. We can see the great times, such as winning championships in the WHA while playing alongside his brother and father, becoming his own person and being accepted as an exceptional hockey player of his own in Philadelphia, or winning the Stanley Cup as a member of the Front office of the Detroit Red Wings.
But there is also a lot of frustration, such as a scheming and horribly mismanaged club in Hartford, the struggle of changing position from wing to defense with little to no guidence, and the disappointment of losing two Stanley Cup championships to the Oilers. The biggest toll however takes the recovery from being impaled by a goal-post while with the Whalers, an incident that could have paralyzed Mark as the goalpost nearly pierced his spinal column.
Throughout the book it seems that while the successes is fleeting, the tragedies and struggles appear to stay with you. Maybe that is simply how life is. It is however comforting that the book ends in a high note, with Mark's long and outstanding career finally being rewarded with the induction into the Hockey Hall of Fame, playing in the 2012 Winter Classic alumni game, and the retirement of his jersey by the Flyers, in addition to personal bliss experienced through the birth of a granddaughter and the marriage of a son.
The books is not a masterpiece of literature, but it is a genuine look into the career of one of the best players to ever play the sport. While Mark never fully escapes the shadow of his father, the reader can see how over the course of his life he becomes more than just "Gordie Howe's Son" and becomes a man of his own.
Donnerstag, 20. Februar 2014
Why Vinny has to go
When the Winter Olympics come to a close and the NHL starts back up, there will only be a couple of games left before the Trade deadline and thus it is time for a lot of teams to evaluate their current positions and expectations. Are they buyers or sellers? Should they make some changes? Are there any holes to fill and are there people available for a reasonable price to do so?
For the Philadelphia Flyers this will be a bit of a conundrum, as they have a definitive and glaring need (a #1 defenseman), but few sellers in that category. To make matters worse, it seems like the player they would do best to trade away was a recent signing that just doesn't seem to fit in: Vincent Lecavalier.
Now I'll be the first to admit that I was rather happy with the Lecavalier signing. I thought last year the Flyers lacked a veteran presence among the forwards who could guide some of the younger players. I would have preferred a wing, but Lecavalier was in my opinion the best forward available, could provide some leadership, give the Flyers some depth in case of injury, and should also improve the Flyers horrendous face-off percentage from last year (Giroux was excellent at 56.9%, but the player with the best percentage after that took at least 100 draws was Maxime Talbot at a measely 47.9%, with Couturier, Schenn, Briere, and Fedotenko being even worse. This lead to Giroux taking the most face-offs in the entire league. Meanwhile Lecavalier won 54.5% of his faceoffs last year). Even price point seemed pretty reasonable at $4.5 million a year, though I would have liked somewhat less than 5 years and the NMC seemed annoying.
The problem is, that it didn't quite work out as it seemed. The plan was definitely for Lecavalier to be placed at 2nd line center, and permanently convert Brayden Schenn to wing. However, the Flyers had an absolutely horrible time at finding chemistry early in the season. Various lines involving Lecavalier showed promise, but even they couldn't break the Flyers out of their team-wide scoring slump and the line-juggling continued until the injury bug struck and took out Lecavalier himself for a total of 13 games so far.
In the meantime, two changes to the line-up seemed to bring some life into the team. First Maxime Talbot was traded to Colorado in exchange for Steven Downie, giving the team an actually competent 3rd line winger. Then when Lecavalier suffered a non-displaced fracture in the back, Michael Raffl was recalled and showed some promise after being placed on a line with Giroux and Voracek.
And then suddenly the Flyers had some balance in their roster. They had a finesse-scoring line lead by Claude Giroux. They had a grinding scoring line dominating the boards with Hartnell, Schenn and Simmonds. They had a shutdown line frustrating the opponents with Downie, Couturier and Read. And they had an energy line of Rosehill, Hall, and Rinaldo, getting limited ice time. While the individual lines got hot on separate occasions, they all had a defined and complementary purpose.
When Lecavalier eventually returned, the Flyers had a problem in finding a spot for him, reluctantly placing him as a wing with Couturier. Lecavalier himself is rather ill-equipped to handle this role, being a negative possession player and being woefully inept at playing wing, a fact he himself admits in an episode of the Flyers web documentary series Flight Plan. The odd man out on this scenario was Steve Downie, who would get placed on the 4th line or scratched altogether for BS reasons such as "lacking intensity".
Before the Flyers went on a 5-out-of-6 run ahead of the Olympic Break, they had some struggles, leading to further line-mixing in order to get things going, leading to the following lines:
Now this line-up isn't all bad, and giving the Flyers a very competent 4th line (which has also been a weak point throughout the year, though the contribution of Hall on the PK and in the face-off circle can't be understated), but Lecavalier is still placed on a position he can't succeed, and his stats show it. Bouncing around the line-up Lecavalier has only collected 23 points in 46 games this year. His only valuable contribution at the moment is that he gives a powerful threat on the 2nd power-play unit, as seen in his 7 power-play goals and 11 points on the man-advantage, but that only emphasizes his lack of production at even strength.
Now this isn't entirely Lecavaliers own fault. It is hard to find your role in the line-up when injuries strike and your line-mates change so often. However, it also shows that Lecavalier is the odd-man out as the Flyers are actively searching for a spot for him as no natural integration into the line-up is taking place.
Lecavalier is the solution to a problem that the Flyers don't have, namely a 2nd line Center. Thus it leads to the natural course of action the Flyers should undertake: Trade Vincent Lecavalier. Ideally for a defenseman and/or a left wing.
Now this could be a messy divorce as Lecavalier decided somewhat quickly on Philadelphia, partially because his wife reportedly loved the city after visiting it and asking him to leave again so quickly could leave a bad taste. The bigger problem is that Vincent Lecavalier's contract has a No Movement Clause. This doesn't mean that Lecavalier can't be traded, only that he has to approve a trade. Considering that he is most definitely not oblivious to the fact of his changing linemates and scoring trouble, it shouldn't be too hard to convince him that he would do better playing for a different team that could actually accommodate him.
The other problem is finding a suitable buyer who can offer an appropriate return. While Lecavalier's trade value is definitely down after this season, he should have enough name recognition and promise left to get at least a decent offer. A defenseman is a top priority here because despite some good prospects like Gostisbehere, Hagg and Morin in the pipeline, the Flyers have an immediate need on the blue line. Another thing that would need be addressed is replacing Lecavalier's production, limited as it may be.
The Flyers could also gamble and retain Lecavalier. During the Olympic break he would have had some time to heal from the injuries he suffered earlier in the season (and quite clearly returned to early from) and the team would have to hope that he would finally acclimate to a position as a wing. Another road to go down could be trading the Schenn brothers, but considering what the team has given up to acquire the two I think Paul Holmgren would be loath to do that.
The madman solution for the problem of finding a spot for Vinny is placing him at first line center and moving Giroux to wing. Giroux has played wing before and Vinny is definitely a natural center. However, Giroux is the top line center on this team and there is no reason to move him out of that position and disrupting the Flyers current best line.
To make a long story short, Vincent Lecavalier is a player that simply doesn't have a role in this line-up and seems incapable of adapting to a different role than a scoring center. I would definitely not be surprised if he was gone at the trade deadline.
For the Philadelphia Flyers this will be a bit of a conundrum, as they have a definitive and glaring need (a #1 defenseman), but few sellers in that category. To make matters worse, it seems like the player they would do best to trade away was a recent signing that just doesn't seem to fit in: Vincent Lecavalier.
Now I'll be the first to admit that I was rather happy with the Lecavalier signing. I thought last year the Flyers lacked a veteran presence among the forwards who could guide some of the younger players. I would have preferred a wing, but Lecavalier was in my opinion the best forward available, could provide some leadership, give the Flyers some depth in case of injury, and should also improve the Flyers horrendous face-off percentage from last year (Giroux was excellent at 56.9%, but the player with the best percentage after that took at least 100 draws was Maxime Talbot at a measely 47.9%, with Couturier, Schenn, Briere, and Fedotenko being even worse. This lead to Giroux taking the most face-offs in the entire league. Meanwhile Lecavalier won 54.5% of his faceoffs last year). Even price point seemed pretty reasonable at $4.5 million a year, though I would have liked somewhat less than 5 years and the NMC seemed annoying.
The problem is, that it didn't quite work out as it seemed. The plan was definitely for Lecavalier to be placed at 2nd line center, and permanently convert Brayden Schenn to wing. However, the Flyers had an absolutely horrible time at finding chemistry early in the season. Various lines involving Lecavalier showed promise, but even they couldn't break the Flyers out of their team-wide scoring slump and the line-juggling continued until the injury bug struck and took out Lecavalier himself for a total of 13 games so far.
In the meantime, two changes to the line-up seemed to bring some life into the team. First Maxime Talbot was traded to Colorado in exchange for Steven Downie, giving the team an actually competent 3rd line winger. Then when Lecavalier suffered a non-displaced fracture in the back, Michael Raffl was recalled and showed some promise after being placed on a line with Giroux and Voracek.
And then suddenly the Flyers had some balance in their roster. They had a finesse-scoring line lead by Claude Giroux. They had a grinding scoring line dominating the boards with Hartnell, Schenn and Simmonds. They had a shutdown line frustrating the opponents with Downie, Couturier and Read. And they had an energy line of Rosehill, Hall, and Rinaldo, getting limited ice time. While the individual lines got hot on separate occasions, they all had a defined and complementary purpose.
When Lecavalier eventually returned, the Flyers had a problem in finding a spot for him, reluctantly placing him as a wing with Couturier. Lecavalier himself is rather ill-equipped to handle this role, being a negative possession player and being woefully inept at playing wing, a fact he himself admits in an episode of the Flyers web documentary series Flight Plan. The odd man out on this scenario was Steve Downie, who would get placed on the 4th line or scratched altogether for BS reasons such as "lacking intensity".
Before the Flyers went on a 5-out-of-6 run ahead of the Olympic Break, they had some struggles, leading to further line-mixing in order to get things going, leading to the following lines:
Hartnell - Giroux - Voracek
Lecavalier - Schenn - Simmonds
Downie - Couturier - Read
Raffl - Hall - Rinaldo
Now this line-up isn't all bad, and giving the Flyers a very competent 4th line (which has also been a weak point throughout the year, though the contribution of Hall on the PK and in the face-off circle can't be understated), but Lecavalier is still placed on a position he can't succeed, and his stats show it. Bouncing around the line-up Lecavalier has only collected 23 points in 46 games this year. His only valuable contribution at the moment is that he gives a powerful threat on the 2nd power-play unit, as seen in his 7 power-play goals and 11 points on the man-advantage, but that only emphasizes his lack of production at even strength.
Now this isn't entirely Lecavaliers own fault. It is hard to find your role in the line-up when injuries strike and your line-mates change so often. However, it also shows that Lecavalier is the odd-man out as the Flyers are actively searching for a spot for him as no natural integration into the line-up is taking place.
Lecavalier is the solution to a problem that the Flyers don't have, namely a 2nd line Center. Thus it leads to the natural course of action the Flyers should undertake: Trade Vincent Lecavalier. Ideally for a defenseman and/or a left wing.
Now this could be a messy divorce as Lecavalier decided somewhat quickly on Philadelphia, partially because his wife reportedly loved the city after visiting it and asking him to leave again so quickly could leave a bad taste. The bigger problem is that Vincent Lecavalier's contract has a No Movement Clause. This doesn't mean that Lecavalier can't be traded, only that he has to approve a trade. Considering that he is most definitely not oblivious to the fact of his changing linemates and scoring trouble, it shouldn't be too hard to convince him that he would do better playing for a different team that could actually accommodate him.
The other problem is finding a suitable buyer who can offer an appropriate return. While Lecavalier's trade value is definitely down after this season, he should have enough name recognition and promise left to get at least a decent offer. A defenseman is a top priority here because despite some good prospects like Gostisbehere, Hagg and Morin in the pipeline, the Flyers have an immediate need on the blue line. Another thing that would need be addressed is replacing Lecavalier's production, limited as it may be.
The Flyers could also gamble and retain Lecavalier. During the Olympic break he would have had some time to heal from the injuries he suffered earlier in the season (and quite clearly returned to early from) and the team would have to hope that he would finally acclimate to a position as a wing. Another road to go down could be trading the Schenn brothers, but considering what the team has given up to acquire the two I think Paul Holmgren would be loath to do that.
The madman solution for the problem of finding a spot for Vinny is placing him at first line center and moving Giroux to wing. Giroux has played wing before and Vinny is definitely a natural center. However, Giroux is the top line center on this team and there is no reason to move him out of that position and disrupting the Flyers current best line.
To make a long story short, Vincent Lecavalier is a player that simply doesn't have a role in this line-up and seems incapable of adapting to a different role than a scoring center. I would definitely not be surprised if he was gone at the trade deadline.
Samstag, 15. Februar 2014
Book Review: Flyers Lives
But let's put first things first: The book is a collection of mini-biographies/interviews with twenty-one players throughout the history of the Philadelphia Flyers, reaching from the Broad Street Bullies to modern day. Each chapter focuses on one particular player, discussing his career, their relationship with the organization, as well as some personal anecdotes. Interestingly, the book also asks each player to weigh in on the current state of player development and advice they would give to parents.
The players showcased are in order: Bernie Parent, Bobby Clarke, Bob Kelly, Bill Barber, Dave Schultz, Paul Holmgren, Brian Propp, Tim Kerr, Brad Marsh, Mark Howe, Dave Poulin, Rick Tocchet, Ron Hextall, Chris Therien, Keith Jones, Keith Primeau, Danny Briere, Claude Giroux, Scott Hartnell, Chris Pronger and James van Riemsdyk. This list covers a lot of ground and most of the big names that have suited up for the Orange and Black. It also includes some people I would not have expected in such a book, namely Bob Kelly and Brad Marsh, and reading it also provides a nice sense of continuity and passing the torch. But it also has some omissions that seem odd, leaving a glaring hole in the 90s with none of Eric Lindros, John LeClair or Eric Desjardins getting their own section. It should also be noted that many of the retired players still have very close ties with the organization, as members of the front office, ambassadors, or broadcasters, and thus seem to be somewhat chosen due to availability.
The book in general seems a bit whitewashed. Eric Lindros is hardly mentioned, and Pelle Lindbergh's death isn't talked about at all despite having such a large impact on many of the players that are subject to this book. Given this, I am surprised that the tragic death of Tim Kerr's wife, Kathy, shortly after childbirth was brought up at all. However, the book surrounds it in Kerr's history of injuries, and the quote of Kerr following it seems to be in response to a question solely about his injuries.
While the whitewashed nature of the book could have been expected given the author's relation to the organization, the most peculiar part of the book are the last two chapters revolving around Chris Pronger and James van Riemsdyk. Both are no longer players of the organization through different circumstances. Pronger is in injury-related quasi-retirement, and van Riemsdyk was traded, a fact that the book acknowledges. As a fan of the organization this leaves a somewhat bitter taste behind when reading it, particularly as the end of the book. An additional chapter, with a general overview and a look forward into the future would have been nice.
The book as a whole seems somewhat rushed in order to capitalize on a recent fascination with the history of the franchise in the wake of the 2012 Winter Classic, an HBO documentary about the Broad Street Bullies, and the announcement of the plans for a feature film directed by Rob Zombie dealing with the same subject matter. The last two chapters seem to have survived and been included over more interesting and less bitter options due to deadline pressure.
The writing is technically competent, but one thing that bothered me throughout the book is the overuse of a framing device. Each time the book jumps forward a couple of years in the life of a player to the next important formative experience, the book puts it into the context of the current events of the day, e.g. what there were Olympics, political uprisings, or a certain significant event in pop culture. This leads occasionally to repetition, and also becomes a disruption to the flow of the reader when some pages are almost entirely a footnote, explaining who Brian Boitano or Bill Buckner were.
Overall, the book is a decent time-waster and at least a nice glimpse into the lives of several Flyers heroes of the past. However, it falls woefully short of the potential that lies within the concept, largely in part of executive meddling and/or in the interest of self-censorship. I would also have a hard time figuring out any reason to be interested in this book if I wasn't already a fan of the Flyers.
Freitag, 14. Februar 2014
Why the NHL must switch to a three point system
The NHL season is drawing to a close. When the players return from the olympics, no teams will have more than 25 games left in their season. It's go time. And every year around this time, people calculate up what the standings would look like if the NHL point system was different. Even a couple of websites have popped up to make this much easier, like hockeystandings.info to name one example.
The biggest point of contention here is of course the "loser point" or "Bettman point", as it is often described. An additional point is given away in a game that goes to overtime, or *gasp* a shootout. It is often described as creating false parity, and many people state the opinion that a team who lost shouldn't get a point at all. And indeed, it is true that the NHL conjured a point out of thin air to award in an overtime situation. However, it is the point that is being awarded to the winner.
Origins
Regular season overtime was introduced in the NHL in 1999. Up to that point, a game could end three different ways from the perspective of one team: You could win, you could tie, or you could lose. Those you could earn three different amounts of points in a game: 2, 1, or none.
When the NHL introduced overtime, they did not adjust this system despite there now being more possible outcomes for any given game. It was sort of tradition that teams would earn something for remaining steadfast and not budging to the other team, even if it resulted in a stalemate. While ties are not popular, they show more often than not that the teams were evenly matched in the contest. Thus they would split the total if they were tied after 60 minutes.
However, a team would get an additional point if they could score in overtime, and thus give the NHL the right to brag that there more games ending with a winner than with an unpopular tie. This remained in the time period between the 1999-2000 season and the season long lockout in 2004-05, after which the shootout was introduced and ties were removed from the results entirely.
Overtime is often very exciting. There is a thrill in sudden death and a game without 2nd chances. Where there won't be an opportunity to make amends. In the playoffs, you might not even get another game with such an opportunity either. However, the excitement of overtime the NHL regularly experiences in the playoffs did not exactly translate to the regular season.
Problems
There is a flaw with the two point system if overtime exists: Teams have less of an incentive to win in regulation. Before 1999, winning in regulation had two advantages: You improved your own point total, and you denied points to the opponent. The reverse is also true, as losing would result in having no points at all. It was a high risk-high reward gamble.
With overtime, teams can just play it safe if the game is tied at the end of regulation. Unless the teams involved are in direct competition for a playoff spot, it rarely matters that a the other team gets a point, and you still retain the chance to earn the maximum amount of points a team could get, while having one point guaranteed.
There is also the problem of the shootout. It is thought of by many as a sideshow and an illegitimate way of ending a hockey game. And to a certain extend those people are right, as the situation in a shootout is hard to compare of the common, team-oriented play otherwise seen in the sport. While breakaways and penalty shots exist, they are the consequent result of team-oriented play and hockey sense, and there is much more pressure within the situation as unlike a round of the shootout, there are not other opportunities to score and thus they have more importance.
Why a three-point system would work
Many leagues around the world, such as the Czech Extraliga, the KHL or the Swedish Hockey League (formerly called "Elitserien", why they switched to a much more boring name I still don't understand) use a three point system: Winning in regulation is worth three points while a loss is zero points. When the game is tied after 60 minutes, the game goes to overtime and later a shootout, with the winning team awarded two points and the losing team one point.
This retains the integrity of regulation play. While you can still earn points by playing it safe late in the game in a tied situation, both teams will be punished as they can not gain the full amount if they took on a risk. It also rewards teams who fight and succeed in a comeback, and punishes those which falter under the pressure of a late rally by the opponent. It adds excitement to regulation play.
It also has the added advantage of making every game played worth the same amount of total points, as it is quite strange that under the current rules in the NHL, different games are worth different amounts of points depending on the outcome.
Reading the standings
One criticism that is levied against the three-point system is that it makes the standings of the NHL less readable. I believe the contrary.
Currently the Standings show Wins, Losses, and Overtime losses, as well as the resulting point totals. This suggests that it is possible to lose a game in different ways, but only win in one way, which makes very little logical sense.
Additionally there is the problem that the NHL, responding to the detractors of the shootout, added a new tie-breaker called "Regulation and overtime wins". This already adds an additional column to determine the standings even before looking at goals for and goals against. It is in fact already a pseudo-three-point system, but one that requires some additional calculation by the people looking at the standings.
Additionally, the current standings format also obscures information, as the number of wins in overtime a team amassed can not be determined at all by looking at the standings right now.
Of course most of this only pertains to people who actually know the tie-breaking procedure the NHL uses. Most casual fans only look at the point total and the number of games played, and approximate how likely a team is to make the playoffs from there.
Why not just remove the loser point?
An alternative solution that is often recommended is simply removing the "loser point" and just make it wins and losses, regardless of when those games are decided. It would simplify the game and make the standings easier to read.
To me I think this to be a worse option. For one, it makes those late rallies less rewarding. Even if you manage to push the game to overtime, the effort might be futile anyway. The second problem with this system is that it puts more emphasis on the shootout, rather than less. A strange thing to observe, as this system is often proposed by the greatest critics of the shootout.
I also believe that this system would be harder to be accepted by the owners. A couple of years ago Islanders owner Charles Wang suggest a system where every NHL team makes the playoffs. The reason for this is obvious: It makes even cellar dwellers have hope. If a team could possibly win, fans will buy tickets, and that will of course be beneficial to the owners. A simple, win-loss system would bring about the separation between competitive teams and bottom feeders much earlier in the season, and thus the owners of less successful teams would sell less tickets later into the season.
The bigger divide between winning and losing in a three-point system would have a similar effect, though it would be to a much smaller degree.
Conclusion
The three-point system is in my opinion a necessary change the NHL must implement as soon as possible. It gives greater legitimacy to an outcome while improving play and upping the stakes for teams. It should also lessen the grief the NHL gets from many of its more traditionalist fans who are dissatisfied with the shootouts, as they will be less of a deciding factor for playoff races.
The biggest point of contention here is of course the "loser point" or "Bettman point", as it is often described. An additional point is given away in a game that goes to overtime, or *gasp* a shootout. It is often described as creating false parity, and many people state the opinion that a team who lost shouldn't get a point at all. And indeed, it is true that the NHL conjured a point out of thin air to award in an overtime situation. However, it is the point that is being awarded to the winner.
Origins
Regular season overtime was introduced in the NHL in 1999. Up to that point, a game could end three different ways from the perspective of one team: You could win, you could tie, or you could lose. Those you could earn three different amounts of points in a game: 2, 1, or none.
When the NHL introduced overtime, they did not adjust this system despite there now being more possible outcomes for any given game. It was sort of tradition that teams would earn something for remaining steadfast and not budging to the other team, even if it resulted in a stalemate. While ties are not popular, they show more often than not that the teams were evenly matched in the contest. Thus they would split the total if they were tied after 60 minutes.
However, a team would get an additional point if they could score in overtime, and thus give the NHL the right to brag that there more games ending with a winner than with an unpopular tie. This remained in the time period between the 1999-2000 season and the season long lockout in 2004-05, after which the shootout was introduced and ties were removed from the results entirely.
Overtime is often very exciting. There is a thrill in sudden death and a game without 2nd chances. Where there won't be an opportunity to make amends. In the playoffs, you might not even get another game with such an opportunity either. However, the excitement of overtime the NHL regularly experiences in the playoffs did not exactly translate to the regular season.
Problems
There is a flaw with the two point system if overtime exists: Teams have less of an incentive to win in regulation. Before 1999, winning in regulation had two advantages: You improved your own point total, and you denied points to the opponent. The reverse is also true, as losing would result in having no points at all. It was a high risk-high reward gamble.
With overtime, teams can just play it safe if the game is tied at the end of regulation. Unless the teams involved are in direct competition for a playoff spot, it rarely matters that a the other team gets a point, and you still retain the chance to earn the maximum amount of points a team could get, while having one point guaranteed.
There is also the problem of the shootout. It is thought of by many as a sideshow and an illegitimate way of ending a hockey game. And to a certain extend those people are right, as the situation in a shootout is hard to compare of the common, team-oriented play otherwise seen in the sport. While breakaways and penalty shots exist, they are the consequent result of team-oriented play and hockey sense, and there is much more pressure within the situation as unlike a round of the shootout, there are not other opportunities to score and thus they have more importance.
Why a three-point system would work
Many leagues around the world, such as the Czech Extraliga, the KHL or the Swedish Hockey League (formerly called "Elitserien", why they switched to a much more boring name I still don't understand) use a three point system: Winning in regulation is worth three points while a loss is zero points. When the game is tied after 60 minutes, the game goes to overtime and later a shootout, with the winning team awarded two points and the losing team one point.
This retains the integrity of regulation play. While you can still earn points by playing it safe late in the game in a tied situation, both teams will be punished as they can not gain the full amount if they took on a risk. It also rewards teams who fight and succeed in a comeback, and punishes those which falter under the pressure of a late rally by the opponent. It adds excitement to regulation play.
It also has the added advantage of making every game played worth the same amount of total points, as it is quite strange that under the current rules in the NHL, different games are worth different amounts of points depending on the outcome.
Reading the standings
One criticism that is levied against the three-point system is that it makes the standings of the NHL less readable. I believe the contrary.
Currently the Standings show Wins, Losses, and Overtime losses, as well as the resulting point totals. This suggests that it is possible to lose a game in different ways, but only win in one way, which makes very little logical sense.
Additionally there is the problem that the NHL, responding to the detractors of the shootout, added a new tie-breaker called "Regulation and overtime wins". This already adds an additional column to determine the standings even before looking at goals for and goals against. It is in fact already a pseudo-three-point system, but one that requires some additional calculation by the people looking at the standings.
Additionally, the current standings format also obscures information, as the number of wins in overtime a team amassed can not be determined at all by looking at the standings right now.
Of course most of this only pertains to people who actually know the tie-breaking procedure the NHL uses. Most casual fans only look at the point total and the number of games played, and approximate how likely a team is to make the playoffs from there.
Why not just remove the loser point?
An alternative solution that is often recommended is simply removing the "loser point" and just make it wins and losses, regardless of when those games are decided. It would simplify the game and make the standings easier to read.
To me I think this to be a worse option. For one, it makes those late rallies less rewarding. Even if you manage to push the game to overtime, the effort might be futile anyway. The second problem with this system is that it puts more emphasis on the shootout, rather than less. A strange thing to observe, as this system is often proposed by the greatest critics of the shootout.
I also believe that this system would be harder to be accepted by the owners. A couple of years ago Islanders owner Charles Wang suggest a system where every NHL team makes the playoffs. The reason for this is obvious: It makes even cellar dwellers have hope. If a team could possibly win, fans will buy tickets, and that will of course be beneficial to the owners. A simple, win-loss system would bring about the separation between competitive teams and bottom feeders much earlier in the season, and thus the owners of less successful teams would sell less tickets later into the season.
The bigger divide between winning and losing in a three-point system would have a similar effect, though it would be to a much smaller degree.
Conclusion
The three-point system is in my opinion a necessary change the NHL must implement as soon as possible. It gives greater legitimacy to an outcome while improving play and upping the stakes for teams. It should also lessen the grief the NHL gets from many of its more traditionalist fans who are dissatisfied with the shootouts, as they will be less of a deciding factor for playoff races.
Sidney Crosby's cap hit is not the standard
When the NHL and the NHLPA signed a new collective bargaining agreement a little over a year ago, fans around the globe had to learn a new world order. No longer were cap-circumventing contracts running 12 or more years allowed. No longer could the cap numbers be lowered and obscured by adding small-salary years at the tail end. This of course makes comparison between contracts under the previous system and a new one a little bit problematic, and that seems to impede the instant-analysis of most armchair GMs around the league.
The biggest nuisance here is when new contracts for star players such as Getzlaf, Perry, Giroux, or even speculated extensions for players like Toews and Kane are being inevitably compared to the contract of Sidney Crosby. Usually the phrase "Crosby money" will be used. The problem here is that it really isn't.
Outset
Matter of fact is, Sidney Crosby's contract is of a cap circumventing nature. Crosby makes $104.4 million stretched over 12 years. This of course exceeds the new limitation on contract length of 8 years. In three of these four additional years, his salary is only $3 million, pushing his cap hit down to $8.7 million. It should also be noted here that Crosby chose this number in reference to 87, his lucky number.
All of this also means that the Penguins run the risk of a cap penalty should Crosby retire early (and though I do not wish it upon him, with his history of concussions this is a distinct possibility). For example, should Crosby retire in 2020, the Penguins will have reaped cap savings of $15,900,000 and will be punished by having a cap penalty of $3,180,000 until 2025.
True Cap Numbers
While all this is true, it tells us very little about his actual worth. For this I have taken the first eight years of his contract and calculated the cap hit they would cause if those were the only contract years. I've done the same for several other players who have cap circumventing contracts.
| Name | Duration | Last year | Total salary | Adj. Cap hit | Act. Cap Hit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sidney Crosby | 8 | 2020-21 | $85,800,000 | $10,725,000 | $8,700,000 |
| Alexander Ovechkin | 8 | 2015-16 | $74,000,000 | $9,250,000 | $9,538,462 |
| Ilya Kovalchuk | 8 | 2017-18 | $79,000,000 | $9,875,000 | $6,666,667 |
| Zach Parise | 8 | 2019-20 | $80,000,000 | $10,000,000 | $7,538,462 |
| Ryan Suter | 8 | 2019-20 | $80,000,000 | $10,000,000 | $7,538,462 |
| Shea Weber | 8 | 2019-20 | $92,000,000 | $11,500,000 | $7,857,143 |
I've also added Ilya Kovalchuk's contract. While the contract is no longer active, I believe it to be the most significant example of old cap circumvention. I should also note that Ovechkin's contract is somewhat odd in structure with the more expensive years coming in the 2nd half of his contract, making his adjusted Cap hit less than his actual cap hit.
Now let's look at some contracts which are in fact compliant to the new CBA:
| Name | Duration | Last year | Total salary | Cap hit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evgeni Malkin | 8 | 2021-22 | $76,000,000 | $9,500,000 |
| Corey Perry | 8 | 2020-21 | $69,000,000 | $8,625,000 |
| Ryan Getzlaf | 8 | 2020-201 | $66,000,000 | $8,250,000 |
| Claude Giroux | 8 | 2021-22 | $66,200,000 | $8,275,000 |
| Steven Stamkos | 5 | 2015-16 | $37,500,000 | $7,500,000 |
| Eric Staal | 7 | 2015-16 | $57,750,000 | $8,250,000 |
| Rick Nash | 8 | 2017-18 | $62,400,000 | $7,800,000 |
| Phil Kessel | 8 | 2021-22 | $64,000,000 | $8,000,000 |
| Dion Phaneuf | 7 | 2020-21 | $49,000,000 | $7,000,000 |
| Kris Letang | 8 | 2021-22 | $58,000,000 | $7,250,000 |
| Jason Spezza | 7 | 2014-15 | $49,000,000 | $7,000,000 |
| Brian Campbell | 8 | 2015-16 | $57,143,000 | $7,142,875 |
| Drew Doughty | 8 | 2018-19 | $56,000,000 | $7,000,000 |
| Tukka Rask | 8 | 2020-21 | $56,000,000 | $7,000,000 |
| Henrik Lundqvist | 7 | 2020-21 | $59,500,000 | $8,500,000 |
Some of these contracts such as those of Staal, Doughty, Spezza and Campbell were signed before this new CBA.
The take away here should be comparing the Adjusted cap hit of the Non-compliant contracts with the cap hit of the compliant ones. When we do, the difference is very little. Top players are being paid pretty comparable amounts before and after the change in the CBA. The only difference is that players are no longer being padded out and Cap hits aren't being artificially decreased.
The statement that players are being paid "Crosby money" and do not deserve it is a false one, as Crosby's adjusted cap hit still exceeds those of top players by a healthy amount.
The myth of rising player salaries
Another interesting secondary myth that rises from these changing contract structures is that 2nd line players will soon be paid in the vicinity of $9,000,000. This myth arises from two factors: the perceived rise of salaries of top line players as discussed above; and the expected rise in the salary cap in the coming years.
While it is generally expected that the cap will rise to around $71.1 million next year, it's not like General Managers around the league are unaware of that fact or this is any kind of surprise to them. GMs plan for this sort of thing. 71.1 million is also on the trajectory the salary cap followed since its introduction, except of this season due to the lockout.
Top players are being paid accordingly, but there hasn't really been any jump here and they aren't going to pull the salaries of 2nd liners upward unless they themselves experience a similar adjustment upward. Further, even if there is a scarcity of talent o the open market, General Managers are not all going out on a spending spree and outbid each other while handcuffing themselves from obtaining true talents or paying their drafted talents (exceptions like Ville Leino not withstanding).
While further in the future it will certainly be possible that 2nd liners will be paid the amount top players are being paid today, this will only happen if the NHL experiences a significant boom and its revenues explode, or due to inflation and the devaluation of the U.S. dollar (in which case the value of those dollars will be very different).
So overall, if someone refers to a contract extension as "Crosby money" or talks about player salaries exploding, they're probably wrong.
The Discerning Eye: Teams and their draft records
A controversial opinion I hold is that the Detroit Red Wings are not a very good team for either drafting or developing players. Usually I bring this up when someone states the direct opposite, usually mentioning Datsyuk and Zetterberg. The argument is usually that those two were picked in the later rounds and developed into veritable superstars. While that is definitely true, a good question is why Detroit picked them so late if Detroit's drafting staff was so sure about their talent.
Additionally, these two players were picked in 1998 and 1999 respectively. That's almost 15 years ago (and yes, we're all old). Who has Detroit really developed in the last 10 years or so?
I thought it could be a nice exercise to actually look at an objective measure to see what teams are good at drafting and picking talented players.
The data
For this I have taken the data off of Hockey DB and compiled it. The data includes all games through December 28th, 2013 played by players drafted in the 2000 NHL Entry draft and forward. I've chosen the 2000 Draft as a starting point as this was the first year that every current NHL team had a draft pick. The entire data I used is available as a Google Doc spreadsheet here.
| Division | Draftpicks | NHLPlayers | Games | Goals | Assists | Points | PIMS | NHLPlayer/Draftpick | Games/NHLPlayer | Games/Draftpick | Points/Game | Points/NHLPlayer | Points/Draftpick | |
| Boston Bruins | Atlantic | 101 | 44 | 6969 | 1066 | 1766 | 2832 | 4572 | 0.435643564356436 | 158.386363636364 | 69 | 0.406371071889798 | 64.3636363636364 | 28.039603960396 |
| Buffalo Sabres | Atlantic | 115 | 39 | 9126 | 1496 | 2444 | 3940 | 6060 | 0.339130434782609 | 234 | 79.3565217391304 | 0.431733508656586 | 101.025641025641 | 34.2608695652174 |
| Detroit Red Wings | Atlantic | 108 | 29 | 5744 | 844 | 1374 | 2218 | 2807 | 0.268518518518519 | 198.068965517241 | 53.1851851851852 | 0.386142061281337 | 76.4827586206896 | 20.537037037037 |
| Florida Panthers | Atlantic | 120 | 38 | 6475 | 879 | 1485 | 2364 | 4178 | 0.316666666666667 | 170.394736842105 | 53.9583333333333 | 0.365096525096525 | 62.2105263157895 | 19.7 |
| Montreal Canadiens | Atlantic | 107 | 40 | 8319 | 1182 | 1934 | 3116 | 5363 | 0.373831775700935 | 207.975 | 77.7476635514019 | 0.374564250510879 | 77.9 | 29.1214953271028 |
| Ottawa Senators | Atlantic | 113 | 42 | 8197 | 1069 | 1924 | 2993 | 4929 | 0.371681415929204 | 195.166666666667 | 72.5398230088496 | 0.365133585458094 | 71.2619047619048 | 26.4867256637168 |
| Tampa Bay Lightning | Atlantic | 121 | 36 | 3538 | 440 | 648 | 1088 | 2741 | 0.297520661157025 | 98.2777777777778 | 29.2396694214876 | 0.30751837196156 | 30.2222222222222 | 8.99173553719008 |
| Toronto Maple Leafs | Atlantic | 105 | 41 | 7149 | 1022 | 1751 | 2773 | 2944 | 0.39047619047619 | 174.365853658537 | 68.0857142857143 | 0.387886417680794 | 67.6341463414634 | 26.4095238095238 |
| Chicago Blackhawks | Central | 144 | 47 | 8150 | 1242 | 2315 | 3557 | 5379 | 0.326388888888889 | 173.404255319149 | 56.5972222222222 | 0.436441717791411 | 75.6808510638298 | 24.7013888888889 |
| Colorado Avalanche | Central | 114 | 44 | 7104 | 1111 | 1887 | 2998 | 3656 | 0.385964912280702 | 161.454545454545 | 62.3157894736842 | 0.422015765765766 | 68.1363636363636 | 26.2982456140351 |
| Dallas Stars | Central | 112 | 37 | 6685 | 927 | 1528 | 2455 | 4992 | 0.330357142857143 | 180.675675675676 | 59.6875 | 0.367240089753179 | 66.3513513513514 | 21.9196428571429 |
| Minnesota Wild | Central | 104 | 46 | 7781 | 1121 | 1850 | 2971 | 4957 | 0.442307692307692 | 169.152173913043 | 74.8173076923077 | 0.381827528595296 | 64.5869565217391 | 28.5673076923077 |
| Nashville Predators | Central | 123 | 45 | 7710 | 1059 | 1828 | 2887 | 5454 | 0.365853658536585 | 171.333333333333 | 62.6829268292683 | 0.374448767833982 | 64.1555555555556 | 23.4715447154472 |
| St. Louis Blues | Central | 115 | 43 | 5930 | 926 | 1534 | 2460 | 3767 | 0.373913043478261 | 137.906976744186 | 51.5652173913044 | 0.414839797639123 | 57.2093023255814 | 21.3913043478261 |
| Winnipeg Jets | Central | 119 | 36 | 6558 | 1281 | 1681 | 2962 | 4767 | 0.302521008403361 | 182.166666666667 | 55.109243697479 | 0.45166209210125 | 82.2777777777778 | 24.890756302521 |
| Carolina Hurricanes | Metropolitan | 95 | 30 | 4956 | 753 | 1125 | 1878 | 2595 | 0.31578947368421 | 165.2 | 52.1684210526316 | 0.378934624697337 | 62.6 | 19.7684210526316 |
| Columbus Blue Jackets | Metropolitan | 125 | 48 | 8316 | 1095 | 1625 | 2720 | 7049 | 0.384 | 173.25 | 66.528 | 0.327080327080327 | 56.6666666666667 | 21.76 |
| New Jersey Devils | Metropolitan | 109 | 41 | 5299 | 639 | 1087 | 1726 | 4083 | 0.376146788990826 | 129.243902439024 | 48.6146788990826 | 0.32572183430836 | 42.0975609756098 | 15.8348623853211 |
| New York Islanders | Metropolitan | 116 | 43 | 6227 | 843 | 1391 | 2234 | 3339 | 0.370689655172414 | 144.813953488372 | 53.6810344827586 | 0.358760237674643 | 51.953488372093 | 19.2586206896552 |
| New York Rangers | Metropolitan | 109 | 44 | 7426 | 909 | 1611 | 2520 | 4271 | 0.403669724770642 | 168.772727272727 | 68.1284403669725 | 0.339348235927821 | 57.2727272727273 | 23.1192660550459 |
| Philadelphia Flyers | Metropolitan | 105 | 39 | 7125 | 1319 | 2134 | 3453 | 5123 | 0.371428571428571 | 182.692307692308 | 67.8571428571429 | 0.484631578947368 | 88.5384615384615 | 32.8857142857143 |
| Pittsburgh Penguins | Metropolitan | 110 | 43 | 8130 | 1435 | 2478 | 3913 | 6594 | 0.390909090909091 | 189.06976744186 | 73.9090909090909 | 0.48130381303813 | 91 | 35.5727272727273 |
| Washington Capitals | Metropolitan | 115 | 37 | 7568 | 1274 | 2106 | 3380 | 4105 | 0.321739130434783 | 204.540540540541 | 65.8086956521739 | 0.44661733615222 | 91.3513513513514 | 29.3913043478261 |
| Anaheim Ducks | Pacific | 105 | 41 | 6907 | 1118 | 1752 | 2870 | 4590 | 0.39047619047619 | 168.463414634146 | 65.7809523809524 | 0.415520486463009 | 70 | 27.3333333333333 |
| Calgary Flames | Pacific | 111 | 37 | 6202 | 816 | 1315 | 2131 | 4992 | 0.333333333333333 | 167.621621621622 | 55.8738738738739 | 0.343598839084166 | 57.5945945945946 | 19.1981981981982 |
| Edmonton Oilers | Pacific | 126 | 47 | 7399 | 1074 | 1826 | 2900 | 5167 | 0.373015873015873 | 157.425531914894 | 58.7222222222222 | 0.391944857413164 | 61.7021276595745 | 23.015873015873 |
| Los Angeles Kings | Pacific | 122 | 44 | 8617 | 1386 | 2213 | 3599 | 4737 | 0.360655737704918 | 195.840909090909 | 70.6311475409836 | 0.417662759661135 | 81.7954545454546 | 29.5 |
| Phoenix Coyotes | Pacific | 107 | 31 | 4996 | 686 | 1127 | 1813 | 3275 | 0.289719626168224 | 161.161290322581 | 46.6915887850467 | 0.3628903122498 | 58.4838709677419 | 16.9439252336449 |
| San Jose Sharks | Pacific | 102 | 40 | 7244 | 1158 | 1884 | 3042 | 3839 | 0.392156862745098 | 181.1 | 71.0196078431372 | 0.419933738266151 | 76.05 | 29.8235294117647 |
| Vancouver Canucks | Pacific | 95 | 27 | 4109 | 746 | 1070 | 1816 | 2965 | 0.28421052631579 | 152.185185185185 | 43.2526315789474 | 0.441956680457532 | 67.2592592592592 | 19.1157894736842 |
A word of caution
At this moment I should make note of some limitations of this analysis. While compiling this list was easy enough, it only shows the teams that picked the players, but not how many games of their career each player actually played for those respective teams. Another limitation is that hockey is not just goals and assists, and contributions from defensemen and especially goaltenders are hard to gauge in this manner. Even the number of games played can be significantly reduced for goalies even if they are always healthy, since even fantastic goalies in career years will at most start around 70 games for their team. On the other hand, backup goalies do not show up enough despite their value in my opinion being regularly under-appreciated.
The results
The average number of Draft picks a team has received is between 112 and 113 draft picks. Chicago had by far the most with a whopping 144 picks, beating Edmonton's 126 by 18 picks. Chicago also manages to get a lot of players they draft into the NHL. 47 players is the second highest total of players who have played at least one NHL game, a number they share with Edmonton. Surprisingly Columbus beats this with 48 using 125 picks to do so (3rd highest).
On the other end of the spectrum we have Vancouver (27 players) and Carolina (30 players), which is hardly surprising considering they are the two teams with the fewest draft picks since 2000, 95 picks each. There already seems to be a correlation between the number of draft picks a team has and the number of NHL players that result from it (this correlation seems less strong though once the numbers are being divided by each other).
However, sandwiched in between them is a Detroit, a team one would hardly expect to find here. The Winged Wheelmen only managed to get 29 NHL players from their 108 draft picks (which is in the middle of the pack among all NHL teams). If one looks at the number of NHL players per draft pick (i.e. how likely is it that one of the players picked by a team actually gets into the NHL) the Wings place last at less than 27%. For comparison, the Bruins (43.5%) and Wild (44.2%) are on top.
What is good for the Red Wings is however that the players that make it to the NHL, stay in the NHL. They have the fourth highest average of games played by a player they drafted that made it to the NHL, with 198. This is almost a full 100 games more than the last ranked team, Tampa Bay Lightning, who are also the only team to get less than 100 games from each player they pick. The Buffalo Sabres are a surprising first place here, as players they picked stayed an average 234 games in the NHL.
Considering this number, it is less surprising that the Buffalo Sabres also get the most number of points per player that manages to get into the NHL, at 101. They are the only team above 100 even beating out the Capitals and Penguins (91 each) who can boast players like Ovechkin, Semin, Crosby or Malkin. Their rank falls a bit when looking at it on a per game basis, but is still good.
When adjusting the statistics to a per game basis (i.e. the number of points per game scored by players drafted by a team) the Flyers make a somewhat surprising appearance on top, narrowly beating out the Penguins. The Capitals are fourth, but above them to my astonishment rank the Winnipeg Jets née Atlanta Thrashers, but then one might remember that Ilya Kovalchuk and Danny Heatley were drafted by that organization. Detroit ranks in the middle of the pack here.
The team that seems to be doing worst at here is the Tampa Bay Lightning, who rank near the bottom of the NHL players per draft pick and are dead last in points per game played by their draft picks and games those draft picks even get to play in the NHL on average.
The Buffalo Sabres on the other hand have a very strong showing in this analysis. This also seems mostly through longevity of their drafted players.
Interpretation
While the Detroit Red Wings do not suck outright in developing NHL talent, it is still very surprising that so few players they have picked since 2000 actually managed to get into the NHL. The picks they have made and resulted in a points percentage ranking only around the middle of the NHL. The Red Wings management also has an approach to trading that can only be described as "ultra-conservative". Additionally it seems that they a hard time getting big ticket free agents sign there (e.g. Suter) and are reduced to picking up veterans on their last legs like Modano or Alfredsson. Zetterberg and Datsyuk aren't getting younger either.
Even Steve Yzerman doesn't seem to be doing too hot either in Tampa. Though the 10 years also taken into consideration in this analysis prior to his involvement are definitely a large part of the Lightning's miserable showing in this set of data, one should note that only 4 players of the 28 drafted by Yzerman have managed to make it to the NHL so far, and they have combined for 55 points in 159 games. Considering that Yzerman was groomed to be Detroit's next GM, this seems worrisome.
Taking all these factors into consideration one may very well wonder how long the Red Wings can keep up with the rest of the league.
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